DOI: https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2021-1-20-30
Critical potential of feminist epistemology
Nina Yu. Ignatova
Doctor of Philosophy, Docent,
Professor of the Department of Humanitarian and Social and Economic Education
Nizhny Tagil Technological Institute (Branch) of Ural Federal University,
59, Krasnogvardeyskaya st., Nizhny Tagil,
Sverdlovsk Oblast, 622013, Russia;
e-mail: nina1316@yandex.ru
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0563-5422
ResearcherID: AAG-4874-2020
The article explores the arguments in favor of feminist epistemology used in the works of L. Code, S. Harding, D. Haraway, J. Lloyd and other gender (radical) feminists. The sources of feminist epistemology are the naturalized epistemology and the thesis of underdetermination by W. Quine, the views of W. Sellars, Marxism, the strong program of sociology of knowledge, logical positivism. The features of feminist epistemology include many signature schemes, the tendency to use different schemes from suitable disciplines, rethinking of the concepts «knowledge» and «knower» for previously excluded or non-included groups of women, people with disabilities, representatives of different races, sexual minorities. Another feature is that «Feminine» experience and voice, viewed from an essentialist or non-essentialist approach, are considered the grounds for the position of «knower». The article examines the critical remarks made by feminists against the assumptions of traditional epistemology: universal human nature, «a view from nowhere», pure impersonal reason, the assumption of «Robinsonade». Attention to subjectivity, values and selfish interests in the production of knowledge should be considered a merit of feminist epistemology. However, L. Laudan has already shown that no one, including representatives of feminist epistemology, have demonstrated the plausibility, let alone the veracity of judgements that justify any number of possible interpretations of the knowledge gained. The paper shows that feminist epistemology cannot avoid the well-known vicissitudes of epistemological relativism. However, feminist epistemology deserves the attention of philosophers because it is part of a broader relativist turn in social sciences and the humanities that seeks to extend its criticism to scientific knowledge.
Keywords: feminist epistemology, knowledge, knower, D. Haraway, S. Harding, L. Code, D. Haraway, gender feminism, epistemological relativism.
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Received: 22.12.2020. Accepted: 05.02.2021
For citation:
Ignatova N.Yu. [Critical potential of feminist epistemology]. Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Filosofia. Psihologia. Sociologia [Perm University Herald. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology], 2021, issue 1, pp. 20–30 (in Russian). DOI: https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2021-1-20-30